Noticias

On June 6^th, Chile’s Competition Tribunal (TDLC) issued its decision imposing fines on Banco de Chile and Consorcio for the simultaneous participation of Hernán Büchi Buc as a director and relevant executive in both competing firms. The ruling stems from a complaint filed by the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE) in December 2021.

In its ruling, the TDLC stated that the prohibition on interlocking “seeks to prevent the risk of information exchange between competitors or the elimination of the uncertainty inherent in a competitive market, which may arise when the same individual simultaneously holds key positions in competing firms.” The TDLC imposed fines totaling USD 3.5 million on Banco de Chile and USD 1.7 million on Consorcio.

The TDLC found that Büchi simultaneously served as a member of the board and/or as a relevant executive at Banco de Chile, Consorcio, and Falabella −firms that compete in the provision of banking and insurance products and services (Banco de Chile, Consorcio, and Falabella), as well as in securities brokerage services (Banco de Chile and Consorcio).

The FNE’s complaint originated from an ex-officio investigation conducted by its Compliance Enforcement Division using technological tools designed to detect links between competitors through ownership structures or shared individuals.

The same investigation led to another complaint filed in December 2021 by the FNE against Juan Hurtado Vicuña, Consorcio, and Larraín Vial, also for interlocking. That case was ruled by the TDLC in April 2025, imposing fines exceeding USD 2.6 Million. The TDLC, confirming the scope of such decision, held that interlocking can occur through parent companies of firms operating in the same market. The ruling affirmed that both individuals who engaged in the prohibited conduct and the competing companies involved are liable for the infringement.

National Economic Prosecutor Jorge Grunberg stated that “this ruling, along with the one issued in April, sends a clear message to the market regarding the seriousness of individuals simultaneously holding positions as directors or relevant executives in competing firms, including cases involving parent companies of operational subsidiaries in a market. Enforcement of the interlocking prohibition is a priority for the FNE to prevent the flow of sensitive information between competitors and to avoid concerted practices or collusive agreements”.

The Prosecutor also emphasized the TDLC’s confirmation that the interlocking between competitors’ prohibition is absolute and does not require evidence of anticompetitive effects, and that both the individual and companies involved are liable for this infringement.

Initially, the FNE also accused Falabella and Büchi, but both parties ended the proceedings after reaching settlement agreements with the FNE, which were approved by the TDLC. In these agreements, Falabella and Büchi acknowledged the factual basis of the complaint and committed to Büchi’s resignation from Falabella’s board. Moreover, Falabella paid over USD 1.5 Million, while Büchi agreed to pay over USD 190,000 to the Chilean treasury —the highest amount ever paid by an individual in Chile regarding a settlement or sanction imposed by the TDLC.

See TDLC Judgment.

See FNE Complaint.