Noticias

Chile’s Cometition Authority (FNE) has released the preliminary report of its Market Study on E-commerce, offering a detailed assessment of the sector’s competitive dynamics between 2019 and 2024.

The study focused on the e-commerce of durable goods sold to end consumers and took a preventive approach. Its main objectives were to gain an in-depth understanding of how this industry competes—including its commercial dynamics and strategies—and to proactively identify any practices or conditions that could undermine its competitive development.

The FNE paid particular attention to the role of hybrid platforms, which operate simultaneously as direct sellers—buying and reselling products on their own account (first-party or 1P model)—and as intermediaries for independent sellers who use them as a sales channel (third-party or 3P model). The study also examined complementary services such as logistics and payment methods. The FNE concluded that the market remains open to new entrants and that meaningful competitive pressure exists among established players. That said, the sector displays certain characteristics that could pose competition risks in the future, making continued monitoring necessary.

“This study has been very timely. It has allowed us to proactively analyse e-commerce in Chile and understand the dynamics of a sector that is becoming increasingly important for the economy and consumers. We conclude that this is a market that, in general, functions competitively well, and that we will continue to monitor its evolution to prevent certain currently observed practices from affecting free competition,” said Jorge Grunberg, Chile’s National Economic Prosecutor.

Assessment

The FNE notes that e-commerce has grown increasingly central to economic activity, with sales reaching close to US$10 billion in 2025 — around 2.9% of Chile’s nominal GDP. According to data from the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, more and more Chileans are shopping remotely: as of April 2025, online shoppers accounted for 64% of consumers, and by August 2025, 75% of Chileans had made at least one purchase over the internet.

On this point, the Prosecutor noted that the “rise of online commerce, particularly through platforms, has structurally transformed retail trade, well beyond the temporary boost associated with the pandemic.” He added that while consumers have benefited from greater choice and easier price comparison—driving more intense competition among suppliers—sellers, for their part, have come to rely on these platforms as a key channel for reaching customers.

At the platform level, the FNE found a concentrated market structure with a small number of significant players. The report also notes that platform-based commerce has been steadily gaining ground over physical retail, and that large retailers often apply different prices across their online and physical channels—a reflection of channel-specific variables such as logistics costs and local demand conditions.

The preliminary report further finds that consumers are highly price-sensitive and actively shop around. In fact, 78% of online shoppers say they compare prices across more than one platform, and consistently rank delivery time—alongside price—as a key factor in their purchasing decisions.

The study also found that sellers tend to be heavily dependent on a single platform, with more than 50% of their sales going through it. And while platforms do compete with one another, there is a growing trend toward concentration in certain market segments.

Another notable finding is the significant synergy between financial services and e-commerce. The proprietary payment methods offered by some leading platforms play a particularly important role, in some cases accounting for more than half of all online transactions.

As for the terms and conditions governing the relationship between e-commerce platforms and their sellers, the FNE warns that these contain shortcomings that need to be addressed to reduce the risk of potentially abusive unilateral practices.

The FNE therefore recommended that platforms with annual sales exceeding UF 100,000 (approximately US$4.5 million)—which qualify as large companies under Chilean law—adopt terms and conditions that meet minimum standards of transparency and predictability in their dealings with sellers.

The following hybrid platforms, all examined as part of the study, currently fall within the scope of this recommendation: Falabella.com (Chile), Hites.cl, Mercado Libre (Chile), Mundo Líder (Walmart Chile), Paris.cl (Cencosud), and Ripley.com (Chile).

Potential Constraints on Competition

The study examined three mechanisms that may shape the commercial behaviour of sellers.

The first is the role of Key Account Managers (KAMs)—commercial account managers responsible for handling relationships with third-party sellers. The FNE identified these as a significant and potentially risky channel of influence, as they blend commercial support with strategic recommendations that can affect sellers’ competitive decisions.

The second involves algorithmic pricing suggestions made by platforms. The FNE found that these do have some influence on pricing decisions, but uncovered no evidence that platforms or sellers are using algorithms or other digital tools to set personalised prices for individual customers.

The third mechanism is the buy box—the prominent, high-visibility space on a product page from which consumers complete their purchases. The FNE found this to be the mechanism most capable of directly influencing prices, product visibility, and the uptake of complementary services. It also found that the buy box promotes competition among sellers, with the lowest offered price being the primary criterion for winning the featured placement.

Overall, the FNE concluded that while all three mechanisms could potentially be used to facilitate anticompetitive conduct, none of them is currently operating in a way that restricts competition.

Turning to price parity agreements, the FNE found that in Chile the competitive risk does not appear to stem from explicit contractual clauses, but rather from informal commercial enforcement mechanisms that can align pricing across channels without the need for a formal obligation.

In this context, the FNE also identified a clause in Mercado Libre’s terms and conditions that allowed the platform to demand corrections or impose sanctions on sellers whose prices were rated unfavourably when compared to other channels. During the course of the study, the company chose to remove this provision and informed the FNE that it had never been applied in Chile.

The FNE ruled out that the buy box is currently being used to impose de facto price parity in Chile, but cautioned that KAM-led commercial management could be used for that purpose—though pro-competitive explanations consistent with the available evidence cannot be excluded. For this reason, the report flagged KAM commercial management as an area warranting ongoing monitoring to safeguard the competitive functioning of the market.

Recommendation

The preliminary report includes a formal recommendation to market operators, issued under the FNE’s statutory powers.

The recommendation aims to ensure that the terms and conditions governing the relationship between e-commerce platforms and their regular sellers meet minimum standards of transparency and predictability, thereby reducing the risk of potentially abusive unilateral practices.

The FNE indicated that these criteria should be made available on the platform’s website and/or application, and should meet the following minimum standards:

• Being drafted in clear and comprehensible language, avoiding ambiguous or opaque clauses, and setting out charges, commercial conditions, and the allocation of risk in the event of returns.
• Specifying the grounds on which a seller’s access to the platform—or to certain functionalities, services, or benefits—may be restricted, suspended, or terminated.
• Providing a minimum notice period of at least 15 business days before any changes to terms and conditions that could adversely affect sellers take effect.
• Describing, in plain terms, the main parameters used for product ranking and their relative weight, including whether paid placement can alter a product’s positioning.
• Disclosing what seller-generated data the platform can access, as well as the conditions governing its use and any potential transfer to third parties, to promote transparency and help sellers—current and prospective—compare platforms.
• Establishing a complaints handling system for sellers with defined response timeframes and at no additional cost.
• Offering an alternative dispute resolution mechanism as a practical alternative to litigation.

This preliminary report will be open for public consultation until Monday, 1 June 2026, after which the final report will be published. Interested parties may submit their comments to estudiosdemercado@fne.gob.cl

Related Documents

See the Executive Summary of the Preliminary Report of the E-Commerce Market Study.

See the Preliminary Report of the E-Commerce Market Study.

See the Annexes to the Preliminary Report of the E-Commerce Market Study.

See the Launch Note for the E-Commerce Market Study.

See Previous Market Studies.