Noticias

The Chilean Competition Authority (FNE) was notified on Friday, July 18, of the decision by MCP Group (controller of Valle Nevado and La Parva ski resorts) and Cururo Group (controller of Andacor S.A., operator of El Colorado, Pillán, Volcán Osorno ski resorts, and the Farellones mountain center) not to proceed with the transaction through which MCP sought to acquire decisive influence in Andacor S.A.

This transaction was notified to the FNE in September 2025, giving rise to an investigation that was in the final stage of Phase 2 analysis.

As part of that investigation, on June 8 the FNE issued a Concerns Report, detailing to the parties the substantial risks the transaction would pose to competition. These risks would affect the market for the sale of ski lift tickets in Chile’s Metropolitan Region and surrounding regions by creating a quasi-monopolistic market structure.

According to the investigation’s findings, MCP Group’s acquisition of El Colorado would have concentrated virtually the entire supply in this market, substantially lessening competition and thereby granting the resulting entity both the ability and incentive to raise ski ticket prices. It would also reduce incentives to invest, maintain, or improve service quality in the medium and long term, and negatively impact other competitive variables, to the detriment of consumers.

The Concerns Report also concluded that the efficiencies claimed by the parties, the “failing firm” defense, and other countervailing factors were not substantiated under the terms set forth in the FNE’s Guide for the Analysis of Horizontal Mergers.

Furthermore, the FNE concluded that the remedies proposed by the parties did not effectively address the risks of the transaction, as they were limited exclusively to temporary behavioral commitments focused on regulating competitive market variables (such as investments and new product launches). The commitments offered aimed to replace competition with commercial policies and did not remedy the permanent risks arising from the transaction.

Therefore, the FNE informed the parties that, given the substantial risks associated from a quasi-monopolization of the market, the behavioral measures offered were insufficient to mitigate the identified risks and were neither suitable, effective, nor feasible to prevent the transaction from substantially reducing competition.

In light of the withdrawal presented by the parties, and in accordance with Article 58, paragraphs one and two of Decree Law No. 211 of 1973, the FNE terminated the investigation processed under Case FNE F437-2025, thereby ultimately preserving the current market structure.

See FNE’s Resolution to Archive.